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Polarization is a topic of intense interest among social scientists, but there is significant
disagreement regarding the character of the phenomenon and little understanding of un-
derlying mechanics. A first problem, we argue, is that polarization appears in the liter-
ature as not one concept but many. In the first part of the article, we distinguish nine phe-
nomena that may be considered polarization, with suggestions of appropriate measures
for each. In the second part of the article, we apply this analysis to evaluate the types of
polarization generated by the three major families of computational models proposing
specific mechanisms of opinion polarization.1. Introduction. As a fact of social reality, polarization seems ubiquitous
and all too easy to produce. Any small room filled with enough people and
any remotely contentious issue seems to suffice to create polarization be-
tween rival factions. As a fact of modeling, however, it proves surprisingly
difficult to produce a model in which simple and intuitive mechanisms pro-
duce patterns that even roughly resemble familiar patterns of polarization.
Imitation and the influence of social contacts are an obvious and ubiquitous
aspect of opinion dynamics, but as early as 1964 Robert Abelson noted that
models in which agents imitate the opinions of others seem to tend inevita-
bly toward central convergence. Abelson points out one way computational
models often fail: “Since universal ultimate agreement is an ubiquitous out-*To contact the authors, please write to: Daniel J. Singer, Department of Philosophy,
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All ucome of a very broad class of mathematical models, we are naturally led to
inquire what on earth one must assume in order to generate the bimodal out-
come of community cleavage studies” (1964, 153). Another way that simple
computational models can fail is by producing bifurcation that under itera-
tion progressively drives all agents from middle values to the extremes at 0
and 1. Neither inevitable movement toward a central consensus nor inevita-
ble movement to full polarized extremes seems characteristic of social polar-
ization as we know it.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that models are constructed for many
purposes. Point predictions and a detailed mirroring of a complex reality are
typically not the point and are not at any rate to be expected from simplified
formal models (Epstein and Axtell 1996; Epstein 2006, 2008; Epstein et al.
2007; Miller, Page, and LeBaron 2008; Grim et al. 2013). It is often said of
physical phenomena, for example, that it is simple models constructed in
terms of spheres moving without friction on perfect planes that offers the
clearest explanation and most fundamental understanding. The challenge
for models of polarization that we pursue here, however, is in achieving even
such a basic explanatory model and simple fundamental understanding. The
question is not whether the simple computational models currently available
for opinion polarization offer a realistic portrayal of empirical phenomena.
The question we pursue here is whether available computational models suf-
fice to capture, even roughly, plausible underlying mechanisms.
In what follows we consider the major families of models for social phe-
nomena that have been appealed to as offering clues to the central mecha-
nisms of polarization. Axelrod’s Cultural Diffusion and Polarization models
represent one modeling tradition (Axelrod 1997; Klemm et al. 2005; Flache
and Macy 2006a; Centola et al. 2007). The Hegselmann-Krause Bounded
Confidence model and Deffuant’s Relative Agreement model define another
approach (Deffuant et al. 2002; Hegselmann and Krause 2002; Deffuant
2006). Models in a Structural Balance tradition constitute a third family
(Heider 1946; Cartwright and Harary 1956; Harary 1959; Macy et al. 2003;
Klemm et al. 2005; Kitts 2006). We extend the analysis to mechanisms for
‘group polarization’ suggested within social psychological theories of self-
categorization (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Hogg, Turner, and Davidson
1990). Each of the models analyzed purports to capture polarization, but it is
clear that both the kinds and the patterns of phenomena they generate vary
widely. We want to frame the behaviors of these disparate models in a way
that allows us to evaluate and compare their abilities to capture plausible
mechanisms for polarization of various kinds in various patterns.
In order to evaluate these models, however, we first need to understand
the explanatory target. Precisely what opinion configurations count as po-
larized? What social dynamics qualify as dynamics of polarization? ‘Polar-
ization’, it turns out, designates not a single unambiguous concept but aThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 117blurred cluster of concepts and measures. A range of very different social
configurations and very different social dynamics have been lumped together
under the term ‘polarization’. For some of these, a particular class of models
may be appropriate. For others it may not. How well a model represents an
explanatory mechanism for polarization therefore depends on what sense of
polarization is at issue. The explanations offered by different models may
not in fact be in competition because the explanans differs: it is different no-
tions of polarization that the models are attempting to explain.
We begin, therefore, by disentangling nine senses of polarization and
briefly sketching appropriate formal measures for each.1 That conceptual/
methodological breakdown gives us the tools necessary to examine polar-
ization models and ascertain the different senses of polarization that a par-
ticular model is capable or incapable of producing. We replace broad claims
that a particular model mechanism increases or decreases polarization with
a finer-tuned evaluation of model effects in terms of each of our nine senses.
Because the nine senses we identify are not exhaustive, we also indicate
when other senses are invoked. By providing a disambiguation of polariza-
tion into these distinct phenomena (and formalized measures for capturing
them), we facilitate the evaluation of a models’ ability to clarify the relevant
social dynamics and thus constitute a useful explanation for at least some
aspects of polarization. In the end we conclude that better modeling, more
finely attuned to the various senses of ‘polarization’, will be required for a
genuine understanding of the quite different opinion dynamics that have
been conflated under that term.
2. TheMany Senses of ‘Polarization’. Common wisdom has it that Amer-
ican society is becoming increasingly polarized (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
2005; Brownstein 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008; Hetherington
and Weiler 2009). There are measurable aspects of political reality that sup-
port that common wisdom. In 1980, only 43% of Americans polled said that
they thought there were important differences between the parties. The fig-
ure is now 74%. In 1976, almost a third thought it did not make a difference
who was president. That figure is now cut in half. Between 1969 and 1976,
the Nixon and Ford years, the rate at which Republicans voted along party
lines was about 65% in both the House and the Senate. The same was true
of Democrats. Between 2001 and 2004, under GeorgeW. Bush, Republicans
voted with their party 90% of the time. Democrats voted with their party
85% of the time (McCarty et al. 2008).
But, this kind of political polarization is certainly not new. George Wash-
ington’s farewell address in 1796 emphasized the danger of factions: “One1. A more complete development of the formal measures as well as an analysis of em-
pirical belief distributions using these measures appears in Bramson et al. (2016).
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All uof the expedients of party to acquire influence . . . is to misrepresent the
opinions and aims of other[s],” he said. The spirit of a party kindles animosity
and “agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms.”
A year later, Thomas Jefferson complained that because of partisan polari-
zation “men who have been intimate all their lives cross the streets to avoid
meeting” (Forman 1900, 69). That was in fact true of Jefferson and John
Adams for most of their political lives.
It has been argued, however, that a focus on political polarization within
the political elite obscures a stable or declining cultural polarization within
the broader population. Onmost issues, public polarization has not increased
between groups, regardless of what groups are being compared: the young
and the old, men and women, the more and the less educated, different re-
gions of the country, or different religious affiliations. On a number of points,
polarization has clearly decreased. Racial integration was once fought vocif-
erously by major portions of the population, but that is certainly not true
now. Views on women’s roles in public life were once extremely contentious
in ways that are now quite generally recognized as archaic. Support for the
death penalty has fallen, while a consensus on crime has moved toward
tougher enforcement. The issue of gay marriage is fast losing its polarizing
edge. Those changes have generally operated in parallel across distinctions of
age, gender, education, region, and religious affiliation (Fiorina et al. 2005).
Polarization is currently a topic of intense interest among social scientists,
with analysis of congressional affiliation and voting patterns, sociological
studies on popular attitudes, and laboratory studies on media influence and
attitude change all in search of a better understanding of central mechanisms
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Ura and Ellis
2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Großer and Palfrey 2013;
Lauderdale 2013; Levendusky 2013; Prior 2013; Leeper 2014; Thomsen
2014; Weinschenk 2014; Mason 2015). Claims regarding polarization, how-
ever, often remain frustratingly vague. However intuitive or intriguing those
claims may be, it is often unclear what social phenomenon of belief config-
uration is at issue or in exactly what sense opinion has or has not become
‘polarized’. The problem is not restricted to popular presentations but ap-
pears in the technical literature of sociology, economics, and political sci-
ence as well. Entire articles appear on polarization with little attempt to make
it clear what precisely is meant by the term.
Greater clarity is demanded both in order to properly characterize social
phenomena and in order to evaluate the models put forward as attempts to
understand the basic social dynamics involved. For our study, as for others,
it proves necessary to analyze different senses of ‘polarization’. We offer a
starter set of nine senses. Formal measures appropriate to each are described
briefly, with a more complete formal treatment left to a separate paper (Bram-
son et al. 2016).This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 119We want to reiterate that the nine senses of ‘polarization’ outlined here
are not exhaustive. For example, the term ‘polarization’ is sometimes used
to refer to a static property (the population is polarized) and sometimes a
process (the population is polarizing).2 The formal measures we provide
are properties of cardinal-valued belief distributions captured at time slices,
which can be used to compare patterns of opinion on different issues or
across different populations (static) or to compare changes across time in
a single issue (process). There may be some senses of polarization that are
intrinsically dynamic that cannot be captured by comparing time slices, but
no senses of this type appear in the literature we have surveyed. For simplic-
ity and clarity we focus on measures of beliefs (alternately: ideas, opinions,
attitudes, etc.) distributed on a normalized spectrum along one dimension
and use the simplest method for representing that distribution: a histogram
of the number of individuals holding a specific belief. The concepts we out-
line have clear analogues in higher dimensions with modified measures, but
higher dimensions also open up the possibility of further senses. Social net-
works, spatial distributions, and categorical data may call for further ap-
proaches, and we show how some of the same senses of polarization can
be applied to those cases as well.
2.1. Polarization Type 1: Spread. An obvious way to measure polari-
zation is in terms of the breadth of opinions; that is, how far apart are the
extremes? DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson call this ‘dispersion’: “the event
that opinions are diverse, ‘far apart’ in content” (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bry-
son 1996, 694). They also outline a dispersion principle: “Other things be-
ing equal, the more dispersed opinion becomes, the more difficult it will be
for the political system to establish and maintain centrist political consensus”
(693).
Polarization in the sense of spread can be measured as the value of the
agent with the highest belief value minus the value of the agent with the
lowest belief value (sometimes called the ‘range’ of the data). Polarization
in the sense of spread is illustrated by the ends of the horizontal bar in fig-
ure 1. In higher dimensions it can be captured as the volume of the minimal
bounding ellipsoid.
Polarization in the sense of spread does not consider whether the agents
with the minimum and maximum beliefs are extreme case outliers or the
edges of large clusters. Spread is indicated in figure 1 using two groups
(light gray and dark gray). But it should be emphasized that spread is a con-
cept that applies to belief distribution across an entire population, rather
than being group defined. Even if the minimum and maximum agents are2. Hacking (1999) notes a similar ambiguity regarding ‘-tion’ words in English gener-
ally.
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All urepresentative of groups at the ends of the belief spectrum, spread will ig-
nore that group characteristic just as it will ignore any groups in between.
This lack of sensitivity to the shape of the distribution makes spread a weak
measure of polarization in isolation, but it does capture the oft-reported fea-
ture of America political polarization that the extremists are getting more
extreme while the overall shape is largely unchanged.
2.2. Polarization Type 2: Dispersion. Another simple way to measure
polarization is statistical dispersion (or statistical variation). Unlike spread,
which considers only the extremes of the population, dispersion considers
only the overall shape of the distribution. Any of various measures of sta-
tistical dispersion might be used: mean difference, average absolute devia-
tion, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, or entropy. Here we use
average absolute deviation from the mean as a simple example. Polarization
differences in the sense of dispersion are illustrated in figure 2. Note that the
diagrams in the figure show dispersion increasing as spread is held constant.
Like spread, dispersion is a measure across the distribution, without being
tied to notions of groups or subpopulations. Note that this also matches dis-
persive polarization as defined in DiMaggio et al. (1996, 694)—“opinions
are diverse, ‘far apart’ in content”—except that it considers all the beliefs
rather than just the extremes.
Although dispersion does not depend on any notion of groups, increas-
ing the measure beyond a certain point on one dimension does require theFigure 2. Distribution c shows greater polarization in the sense of dispersion than
does belief distribution b, which is greater than distribution a. Color version avail-
able as an online enhancement.Figure 1. Belief distribution b shows greater polarization in the sense of spread than
does belief distribution a. Two separate groups are shown, but that is irrelevant to
polarization in the sense of spread. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 121formation of two modes in the distribution (as seen in fig. 2c). Bimodality is
frequently mentioned as a feature of polarized distributions and sometimes
as part of the definition (Fiorina et al. 2005). However, we can also find bi-
modality in distributions for other senses of polarization with specific value
ranges. We revisit this point below.
2.3. Polarization Type 3: Coverage. The views of polarized factions
are often thought of as constituting narrow and tightly packed sets of be-
liefs. A polarized society is thought of as one with little diversity of opinion,
one in which only narrow bands of the opinion space are occupied. A sim-
ple way to envisage polarization in this sense is to think of the spectrum of
possible beliefs as divided into small bins. The proportion of empty bins
will then constitute a measure of polarization as coverage. That discrete
measure, although simple, depends on the choice of bins: varying the width
or location of bins can alter the measure for the same underlying data. A
continuous variation is also possible by using halos of a given radius around
each agent’s belief value and summing the lengths of empty space.
Figure 3 illustrates comparative polarization in the sense of coverage.
Although it is not sensitive to either the shape of the distribution (e.g.,
whether occupied areas are close together or at the extremes) or the number
of agents who hold each position, polarization in the sense of coverage does
capture this basic feature of opinion diversity or variation. Furthermore,
coverage works as a measure for categorical data—data for which the loca-
tion on a spectrum is meaningless—and across any number of dimensions.
Because it is a measure of diversity, with more diversity meaning less po-
larization, we can also apply more sophisticated diversity measures such as
the inverse Simpson index to calculate coverage weighted by the number of
agents holding the beliefs at issue (see Size Parity below).
2.4. Polarization Type 4: Regionalization. Coverage represents how
much of the belief spectrum is occupied by a society, without accounting
for the pattern of areas occupied. ‘Polarization’ can also be used to indicateFigure 3. Distribution a is more polarized than b in the sense of representing less
coverage on the spectrum of potential belief. Although the plots show groups and
differences in heights, neither of those features are aspects of polarization in the
sense of coverage. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All ubelief regionalization, without attending to the total area covered over all. In
considering small bins of possible belief, for example, we might measure
polarization not in terms of how many bins are filled but in terms of how
many empty regions there are between filled areas. The area of uncovered
opinion spaces corresponds directly to the concept of coverage. The number
of uncovered intervals, in contrast, offers a distinct sense in which distribu-
tions can be polarized. Figure 4 shows two cases with the same coverage
but in which counting empty regions between occupied areas gives us a
measure of regionalization polarization in which b is more polarized than a.
Regionalization per se does not distinguish between a case (i) in which
bins between 0 and 0.25 and between 0.35 and 0.60 are filled and a case
(ii) in which bins between 0 and 0.25 and between 0.75 and 1 are filled; that
is, the most basic notion of regionalization does not account for the widths
of the gaps. For some cases, however, this may be the intuitive sense of po-
larization that we want. It can be combined with other measures to get a
more refined description of a phenomenon at issue. Cases i and ii might be
regionalized and have coverage to the same degree, for example, although
the two groups in ii are farther apart in the sense of dispersion and the beliefs
in ii also spread across a wider area.
Regionalization counts the completely distinct clusters in the distribution,
related to but distinct from the number of groups (see below for polarization
in the senses of both Distinctness and Groups). It does not have a simple,
useful extrapolation to higher dimensions and cannot operate on categorical
data. Finer-grained quantitative measures of group differences are presented
below, but all of these depend on the a priori identification of groups within
the data.
Defining Groups.—All of the polarization measures so far have been de-
fined in terms of distribution characteristics observable from the whole pop-
ulation. No concept of groups is required for measures of polarization in terms
of spread, dispersion, coverage, or regionalization. Other senses of polari-
zation must be explicitly defined in terms of groups. One way to categorize
groups is identify them directly from the histogram as collections of individ-
uals categorized by the basins of attraction between local peaks. In this wayFigure 4. Distributions with equal coverage but in which b shows a higher amount
of polarization in the sense of regionalization because of a larger number of empty
spaces between occupied areas. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 123groups are identifiedendogenouslyby thepatterns inbelief values, distinguish-
ing unimodal from bimodal or trimodal distributions (Downey and Huffman
2001).
‘Polarization’ in various group-dependent senses is also used for cases in
which groups are exogenously defined (e.g., by region, ethnicity, sex, edu-
cation level, or other categories). Groups might also be defined in terms of
network links representing association, influence, or communication. For ex-
ample, one can first identify network-based groups using community struc-
ture algorithms, then use those collections of nodes as exogenously defined
groups in order to break down the belief histogram. Exogenously defined
groups may be those indicated by distinct shades in figure 5b. As the two
panels of figure 5 make clear, exogenously defined groups may overlap
in opinion, generating a very different picture than that indicated in the sim-
pler opinion histogram of 5a. The important point is that the application of
each of the group-dependent senses of ‘polarization’ below will depend on
how the groups involved are identified.
2.5. PolarizationType 5:Community Fracturing. Afirst group-dependent
sense of ‘polarization’ is community fracturing: the degree to which the pop-
ulation can be broken into subpopulations. Because different endogenous
and different exogenous senses of ‘group’ will generate differing levels of
community fracturing, this sense offers the level of polarization of the spec-
ified groups rather than of the population as a whole.
Figure 6 shows two belief distributions with groups endogenously de-
fined using a local minima method: the distribution in 6b shows more groupsFigure 5. For exogenously defined groups, the histogram for the entire population
(a) may be broken into varying numbers of overlapping subpopulations, as in
b. Color version available as an online enhancement.Figure 6. Polarization increases from a to b for endogenously defined groups.
Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uthan 6a. The population’s beliefs in the second case are more fragmented,
indicating greater polarization in the sense of community fracturing. A pop-
ulation that moved dynamically from the first pattern to the second would be
a community that showed increased polarization of its endogenously defined
groups.
In some applications groups can be exogenously defined; for example,
one could have opinion data categorized by educational attainment level on
the question of what percentage of the federal budget should be devoted to
education. Distinct educational attainment groups could then be plotted to-
gether on the same belief spectrum. Defining groups endogenously and ex-
ogenously often/typically reveals different groupings of the beliefs. As illus-
trated in figure 7, aggregated communities may produce identical belief
distributions overall yet show very different patterns of polarization in terms
of endogenously defined a and exogenously defined b groups.
Whether groups in the distribution of beliefs are endogenously or exog-
enously defined, community fracturing as a measure of polarization is about
the number of groups. If agents are connected via a network structure, how-
ever, subcommunities may be referred to as ‘polarized’ simply in the sense
that there is little or no communication between them. A similar phenomenon
occurs in spatial models in which the locations of agents, or clusters of agents,
are far apart. Such phenomena can be better thought of as separation and seg-
regation: features that may produce or reflect polarized beliefs and that are
also quantified by the number of groups but are not themselves senses of
opinion polarization because they are not features of belief distributions.
2.6. Polarization Type 6: Distinctness. The belief groups found en-
dogenously or exogenously can form subdistributions that are very clearly
separated (e.g., by a swath of empty bins) or very similar (e.g., two peaks on
the same mountain) or anywhere in between. We define polarization in the
sense of distinctness as the degree to which the group distributions can be
separated. As illustrated in figure 8, for both endogenous and exogenous
groups a is less distinct, and therefore less polarized, than b. For endoge-
nous groups, the group boundary is the local minima at the center (whereFigure 7. Polarization as network fracturing. Although overall histograms are iden-
tical, categorization in terms of networks may reveal either limited (a) or greater
(b) group polarization. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 125they appear to overlap in the diagram); the height of the distribution at that
point measures the distinctness (with greater height indicating less distinct-
ness). For exogenous groups, we can instead measure the overlap of the two
groups; the greater the overlap of the distributions, the less distinct, and the
less polarized, they are.
When there are more than two groups, some aggregation of all pair-wise
comparisons must be made. Some care must also be taken in properly nor-
malizing this measure when the number of groups differs across time or data
sets. Both endogenous and exogenous measure versions can be extended un-
changed to higher dimensions, but other measures (e.g., in terms of distribu-
tion density) may be appropriate as well. It is possible (and in some cases
natural) to deploy and combine multiple measures of the same sense because
they may each pick up different nuances.
What matters for polarization in this sense is how clearly distinct the
groups are, regardless of the distance between them, their size, or their levels
of internal cohesion. This seems to match what DiMaggio et al. call ‘bimo-
dality’. People are polarized “insofar as people with different positions on
an issue cluster into separate camps, with locations between the two modal
positions sparsely occupied” (DiMaggio et al. 1996, 694); distinctness fo-
cuses on the sparse intermodal region. Attitudes toward abortion between
1970 and 1990, for example, show clear and persistent distinctness (fig. 9).
2.7. Polarization Type 7: Group Divergence. While group distinctness
captures how distinct the separation is between groups, regardless of how
far away those groups are in their beliefs, group divergence captures the op-
posite: how distant the groups’ characteristic ideas are without attention to
potential group overlap. This sense also fits the definition of ‘dispersion’ in
DiMaggio et al. (1996), especially when combined with an assumption of
bimodality. One simple measure for divergence will be the distance between
groupmeans, whether those groups are defined endogenously or exogenously.
As figure 10 indicates, group divergence may increase while measures such
as distinctness, spread, and coverage remain constant.
Like distinctness, the measure of divergence works unchanged for higher
dimensions with appropriate distance measures, but some aggregation schemeFigure 8. Distribution b shows greater polarization than a in terms of distinctness.
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All umust be chosen for more than two groups. If the groups are fully distinct,
then one can also find the distance between the maximum value in one group
to the minimum value in the next, that is, the width of the empty space be-
tween the groups. Both the distance between means and of extremes (and
others) capture this sense of polarization, but they focus on different features
of the distribution and thus can work complementarily, as long as research-
ers are careful to specify the measure used.
2.8. Polarization Type 8: Group Consensus. The beliefs of group mem-
bers can be highly scattered across the spectrum or extremely focused on the
group’s central ideology (fig. 11). The diversity of opinions within groups
constitutes another sense in which those groups can be polarized, indepen-
dent of how far apart their central ideas are and how distinct the groups are.Figure 9. Attitudes toward abortion, distribution by year, from the full sample Gen-
eral Social Survey 1977–94 (DiMaggio et al. 1996).Figure 10. Attitude distribution b shows greater polarization than a in the sense of
group divergence. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 127Prima facie, the greater the variance in beliefs within groups, the more likely
it would seem that members of one group might move toward common
ground with other groups. The more single-minded or unanimous views
are within the groups, the greater the polarization between them and the less
likely any such conciliation.
A simple and suggestive measure of groups consensus is the absolute de-
viation within each group, aggregated over all the groups (e.g., the size-
weighted average). The smaller the variance within each distinct group,
the greater this sense of polarization across the population. As previously
mentioned, this is the main sense in which polarization has increased in
the US legislature (McCarty et al. 2008). It is not the case that the party lines
have shifted much over the past few decades but rather that the party mem-
bers have more consistently voted along the lines of their party.
If the position of the groups’ mean beliefs are fixed and close enough
(low enough divergence), then a change that increases consensus also yields
an increase in distinctness. But it is possible for the group consensus to change
independently of any of the other measures. Depending on the measures used
for each sense and the particular distribution being analyzed, consensus and
distinctness may or may not be mathematically linked even though they are
conceptually distinct.
2.9. Polarization Type 9: Size Parity. A society that has one dominant
opinion group with a few small minority outliers seems less polarized than
one with a few comparably sized competing groups. Groups are more po-
larized in this sense if the different clusters of beliefs are held by equal num-
bers of people (fig. 12). For example, a society in which a small group of
1% of the population with extremist views gains in popularity to capture
a third of the population (while holding all the other measures fixed) is a
society with increasing polarization.
There are a few obvious measures for capturing size parity. If there are
just two groups (which may not exhaust the population) then a direct sub-
traction of their sizes is perhaps sufficient. For larger numbers of groups it isFigure 11. Belief distribution b shows greater polarization than a in the sense of
group consensus. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All upreferable to consider measures that aggregate more intuitively. One exam-
ple is the sum of the differences in size of each group from the mean group
size. Using the proportions of the population for each group, one can also
use an entropy measure or a diversity indicator such as the inverse Simpson
index.
2.10. Further Considerations for the Senses of Polarization. The nine
senses of ‘polarization’ outlined here offer only a starter set, and the senses
can be multiplied quite quickly by a range of other factors.
2.10.1. Polarized versus Polarizing. As noted, ‘polarization’ can be used
to label either the configuration of a population at a time or a particular dy-
namics in the change of a population configuration over time. It is said that
American political opinion is currently polarized. That claim seems to involve
one of the static measures discussed above. But ‘polarization’ may also be
used to mark the process of becoming more polarized in one of these senses.
In this second sense, a community may be marked by polarization as it is
marked by increased spread, distinctness, or solidarity of the opposing groups,
even if the static measure does not show polarization to any great extent on
any of these scales. So, when we ask whether there is polarization in a society,
one question that has to be asked is whether it is polarization in one of our
static senses or polarization in one of the related process senses that is at issue.
2.10.2. Measure Independence andCombinations. Another kind of ques-
tion that must be asked is whether multiple and perhaps mutually dependent
clusters of measures are involved. The nine senses outlined are pair-wise
independent: for any two senses one can construct an example of belief dis-
tributions showing that an increase in one sense can be accompanied by no
change or even a decrease in the other. The concepts and their measures are
not, however, completely orthogonal. Fixing the value of a third measure
may force two others to be positively or negatively related, depending on
the particular measures involved. Consider, for example, relations between
spread, coverage, and dispersion while assuming a belief distribution thatFigure 12. Groups with comparable sizes are more polarized than a large group
with smaller outliers; in the sense of size parity, belief distribution a is more polar-
ized than b. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 129does not completely fill the space between 0 and 1. A simple measure for
spread is the distance between the maximum and minimum observed value.
Coverage is the proportion of bins in which at least one person holds that
bin’s value. Dispersion is the average distance of data points to the popula-
tion mean. To increase spread without varying coverage, we could move all
the data points located at the upper extreme to larger-valued bins. To in-
crease spread without varying dispersion, we can take occupants from near
the upper edge and move one inward and another outward by the same dis-
tance. But if we fix the spread of the distribution, then moving points to in-
crease coverage (by filling in intermediate bins) must change dispersion as
well. Keeping coverage constant while increasing spread will likewise force
an increase in dispersion.
Capturing senses of ‘polarization’ independently is vital for understand-
ing the core conceptual elements of the social phenomena at issue. We think
it is important to keep these different aspects of polarization distinct, partic-
ularly in those cases in which data may exhibit polarization in multiple
senses. The most common measure of polarization in the political literature
is probably bimodality, which is the idea that the population can be usefully
broken down into two subpopulations. Polarization in this sense signals a
balanced deviation from a moderate position. Fiorina and Abrams measure
bimodality in American political opinion, for example, by tracing the drop
in the percentage of respondents labeled moderate combined with balanced
redistribution to both sides of the moderate position. They do not regard ac-
cumulation to only one side as a polarizing trend (Fiorina et al. 2005). But it
is clear that a focus on bimodality alone merges and often blurs a number of
the senses of ‘polarization’ outlined. Community fragmentation plays a role
because bimodality demands exactly two distinguishable groups. The dis-
tinctness of those groups is also important; Fiorina and Abrams are invoking
distinctness when they measure the drop in moderate view holders. Group
divergence and spread are included because these increase when equal num-
bers of responses move to both sides, less so when they move dispropor-
tionately to one side. Neither group solidarity nor size parity is explicitly
invoked in a concept of bimodality, although if there is too little solidarity
or size parity then the two groups on each side of the issue may not be dis-
cernible as such. Importantly, however, many of the concepts commonly
merged in bimodality may also vary independently.
2.10.3. Multiple Dimensions. As noted initially, we have focused on
senses of ‘polarization’ that can obtain in one-dimensional distributions
and for which appropriate measures can be formulated for a single-issue
histogram. Other senses of the term, incorporating one or more of these, will
be appropriate where more than one issue is at stake. One example of a sense
of polarization requiring multiple dimensions is belief convergence. GivenThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All ugroups that are polarized on issue A, are these same groups polarized on B,
C, and D? The more connected rival beliefs are within rival groups, the
greater the polarization across the community. This can be measured using
a data-clustering technique. Another example is belief coherence: are changes
in one belief accompanied by analogous changes in another belief—a soli-
darity of ideas? Coherence of beliefs can be measured using correlations of
the belief values across dimensions. Figure 13 illustrates beliefs on two axes
showing the relative correlation of two opinions on two axes.
In measuring multiple opinions, all the senses of ‘polarization’ above
will return with a new complexity. Groups may have tightly knit sets of opin-
ions that are uniformly polarized in any of the senses noted. But, their opin-
ions on different issues A, B, and C may turn out to be polarized in some of
the importantly different ways we have tried to distinguish.
3. Modeling Polarization. Having disambiguated senses of ‘polariza-
tion’, we are now in a position to examine how various approaches to mod-
eling basic mechanisms of polarization compare in terms of the specific
types of polarization they are, and are not, able to produce. Where possible
we indicate how each of the measures above changes as polarization as de-
fined in the model increases. We cannot cover all models and model vari-
ations that have been offered; we concentrate on what we take to be the
three central families of computational models that have been put forward,
together with a model-suggestive theory from psychology. An evaluation of
the various models that have been proposed, using the tools of our concep-
tual analysis, serves to clarify ways in which individual models can be seen
as illuminating isolated facets of a much more complex social reality.Figure 13. Beliefs on two topics, indicated on the axes, are correlated in b and
not in a. Greater correlation of belief values across multiple issues marks greater
polarization in the sense of belief coherence. Color version available as an online
enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 131The first family of models that we consider targets cultural diffusion and
differentiation as a basic mechanism for polarization. The extensive litera-
ture begins with Axelrod (1997) followed by significant further contribu-
tions in Klemm et al. (2003a, 2003c, 2005), Flache and Macy (2006a), and
Centola et al. (2007). Bounded confidence and relative agreement models
form a second family of models, in which the mechanism put forward for
polarization is one in which updating on others’ opinions is constrained by
a window or graded extent of prior agreement (Deffuant et al. 2002; Hegsel-
mann and Krause 2002; Deffuant 2006). A third family we consider are mod-
els in the structural balance tradition (Heider 1946; Cartwright and Harary
1956; Harary 1959; Macy et al. 2003; Klemm et al. 2005; Kitts 2006). Here
the basic mechanism of polarization is a change in network links of amity
and enmity, further developed in terms of opinion or belief and employing
mechanisms of Hebbian learning and Hopfield networks. Beyond these three
families of models, we also consider ‘group polarization’ from social psy-
chology (Lord et al. 1979; Hogg et al. 1990).
In the following sections, we consider each of these central families of
models with an eye to the nine senses of polarization outlined above. The
focus is on central mechanisms characteristic of each model family, the senses
of polarization in which model output for each family falls, and the senses or
aspects of polarization that fall outside the scope or beyond the reach of each
model family. The goal is a comparative sketch of both promise and prob-
lems: the extent to which different approaches may offer explanatory mech-
anisms for phenomena that appear in some aspect of opinion dynamics but
also the extent to which explanations offered may be incomplete or structur-
ally limited by specific modeling constraints. Are there senses of ‘polariza-
tion’ that these models exhibit or capture particularly well? Are there senses
of ‘polarization’ that will escape them? How good are these models in cap-
turing plausible social psychological mechanisms of polarization, and in
what sense? We offer a summary of the senses of ‘polarization’ connected
with each model in table 1. In the sections that follow, we review in detail
senses of ‘polarization’ and grouped patterns of phenomena in each of the
model families.
3.1. The Axelrod Tradition. Axelrod (1997) proposes that polarization
can arise from an intuitive mechanism that would at first sight seem only
to promote conformity and cultural convergence. We first review Axelrod’s
original version of the model and discuss the senses of polarization it can
and cannot produce. We provide the same treatment for three variants of the
model that differ from the original in ways that affect polarization.
The basic premise is this: people tend to interact more with those like
themselves and tend to become more like those with whom they interact.
But if people come to share one another’s beliefs (or other cultural features)This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 133over time, why do we not observe complete cultural convergence? Axelrod
acknowledges a number of proposed mechanisms for durable cultural differ-
ences—active social differentiation, preferences for extreme views, geograph-
ical isolation, specialization, and exogenous changes in the environment
or technology—but his model relies on none of these. At the model’s core
is a spatially instantiated imitative mechanism that produces cultural conver-
gence within local groups but also progressive differentiation and cultural
isolation from other groups. He refers to that differentiation as ‘polarization’.
Axelrod’s base model consists of 100 agents arranged on a 10  10 lat-
tice such as that illustrated in figure 14. Each agent is connected to four
others: top, bottom, left, and right. The exceptions are those at the edges
or corners of the array, connected to only three and two neighbors, respec-
tively.3 Agents in the model have multiple cultural ‘features’, each of which
carries one of multiple possible ‘traits’. One can think of the features as cat-
egorical variables and the traits as options or values within each category.
For example, the first feature might represent culinary tradition, the second
one the style of dress, the third music, and so on. In the base configuration
an agent’s ‘culture’ is defined by five features (F 5 5) each having one of
10 traits (q5 10): qf ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. For example, agent xmight
have a cultural signature specified by traits {8, 7, 2, 5, 4} while agent y has a
cultural signature specified by traits {1, 4, 4, 8, 4}. Agents are fixed in their
lattice location and hence their interaction partners. Agent interaction and
imitation rates are determined by neighbor similarity, where similarity is
measured as the percentage of feature positions that carry identical traits.
With five features, if a pair of agents share exactly one such element they
are 20% similar; if two elements match then they are 40% similar, and soFigure 14. Typical initial set of “cultures” for a basic Axelrod-style model consist-
ing of 100 agents on a 10  10 lattice with five features and 10 possible traits per
agent. The marked sight shares two of five traits with the site above it, giving it a
cultural similarity score of 40% (Axelrod 1997).3. Results are robust for wrapped-around landscapes as well (Axelrod 1997).
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All uforth. In the example above, agents x and y have a similarity of 20% because
they share only one feature, their fifth: x5 5 y5 5 4. For each iteration, the
model picks at random an agent to be active and one of its neighbors. With
probability equal to their cultural similarity, the two sites interact and the
active agent changes one of its dissimilar elements to that of its neighbor.
If agent i 5 {8, 7, 2, 5, 4} is chosen to be active and it is paired with its
neighbor agent j 5 {8, 4, 9, 5, 1}, for example, the two will interact with
a 40% probability because they have two elements in common. If the inter-
action does happen, agent i changes one of its mismatched elements to
match that of j, becoming perhaps {8, 7, 2, 5, 1}. This change creates a sim-
ilarity score of 60%, yielding an increased probability of future interaction
between the two.
In the course of approximately 80,000 iterations, the model process pro-
duces large areas in which cultures of traits on features are identical: the ‘lo-
cal convergence’ of Axelrod’s title. It is also true, however, that arrays such
as that illustrated do not typically move to full convergence. They instead
tend to produce a small number of culturally isolated stable regions—groups
of identical agents none of whom share features in common with adjacent
groups and so cannot further interact. As an array develops, agents interact
with increasing frequency with those with whom they become increasingly
similar, interacting less frequently with the dissimilar agents. With only a
mechanism of local convergence, small pockets of similar agents emerge
that move toward their own homogeneity and away from that of other groups.
With the parameters described above, Axelrod reports a median of three sta-
ble regions at equilibrium. It is this phenomenon of global separation that
Axelrod refers to as ‘polarization’.
Which of the senses of polarization that we have outlined does Axelrod’s
model capture? In his primary use of the term, Axelrod’s ‘polarization’ refers
to stable, distinct, contiguous, and wholly culturally differentiated regions at
equilibrium. An array is polarized in his sense when there are two or more
stable regions, although we might also extend his usage by speaking of grids
with a greater number of culturally distinct regions as being more polarized.
In this way we can see Axelrod’s ‘polarization’ as a form of community frac-
turing even though measuring the number of groups in this model does not
involve separating histograms at their basins of attraction as described above.
Although the measure is different, the number of isolated regions in Axelrod’s
model is clearly also a way to capture groups of agents with internally sim-
ilar ‘beliefs’ separated from other groups with opposed beliefs.
A fundamental characteristic of Axelrod’s model is its multidimension-
ality: each feature represent a different dimension in which agents or groups
can be the same or different. Although the categorical nature of the traits
means that correlation cannot be applied, it is clear that the model exhibits
polarization in the general sense of belief convergence described in sec-This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 135tion 2.11.3. In the equilibrium state, agents who have the same trait for the
first feature will also have the same trait for the second, third, fourth, and fifth
traits. That mix of traits will be (almost always)4 completely distinct from the
mix of traits of any other group; thus, data clustering will pick out the differ-
ent groups cleanly.
Although the multidimensionality of Axelrod’s model fosters analysis
through additional measures, the categorical nature of the traits precludes
any notion of closeness and with it most of the measures of polarization
we described above. One measure that does apply, expanded to higher di-
mensions, is coverage. By considering the three-dimensional histogram of
agents’ cultures on the F  q discrete belief space, we can count the pro-
portion of empty bins and watch the number grow as the population moves
toward isolated homogeneous communities.
The result that different abutting communities cannot share any of their
cultural traits also sounds much like distinctness, and the result that intra-
group traits become homogeneous sounds much like group coherence, but
these cannot be measured using histograms of beliefs. A notion of similarity
in terms of the number of identical features and using measures based on
Hamming distance or a similar alternative might be developed, however.
For example, spread could be measured as the highest number of pair-wise
dissimilar traits, and dispersion could be taken as average pair-wise dissim-
ilarity. Both of these measures are greatest when there are isolated commu-
nities and zero when there is one homogeneous population. Extensions of
this sort do seem to offer multidimensional categorical analogies to the senses
of polarization outlined.5 Thus, Axelrod’s model nicely instantiates some of
the general concepts of polarization we have described, even though agents
are not characterized in terms of opinions with cardinal belief values, and
therefore other measures would be required to quantify most senses.
3.1.1. Expanding the Parameter Ranges. Axelrod notes a number of in-
triguing features of the model, many of which have been taken up in later
work. Results turn out to be very sensitive to the number of features F and4. There are potential equilibrium configurations in which two or more isolated groups
will happen to converge to the same culture. Such a configuration makes any simple cal-
culation of the number of communities or the distribution of traits problematic and, thus,
will be treated as a special case with an appropriate caveat for all the measures discussed
here.
5. It may be that general categorical measures for the same senses can be developed, but
it may instead be that these would only be applicable to models that share the same fea-
ture/trait structure. We leave open the question whether these would count as different
measures for the same senses or conceptually distinct categorical senses of polarization,
but the former conclusion is tentatively supported by our work so far.
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All utraits q used in the model. Altering numbers of features or traits changes the
final number of stable regions but in opposite directions: the number of sta-
ble regions correlates negatively with the number of features F but posi-
tively with the number of traits q (Klemm et al. 2003b). In Axelrod’s base
case with F 5 5 and q 5 10 on a 10  10 lattice, the result is a median of
three stable regions. When q is increased from 10 to 15, the number of final
regions increases from three to 20; increasing the number of traits increases
the number of stable groups dramatically. If the number of features F is in-
creased to 15, in contrast, the average number of stable regions drops to only
1.2 (Axelrod 1997). Increasing the number of features decreases the number
of stable groups. On reflection, the reason for this model sensitivity is clear.
As the number of features F increases, agents have a greater probability of
having something in common, increasing the probability that they will inter-
act and thus increasing the probability that they will converge, resulting in
fewer final stable groups. As the number of traits increases, however, it be-
comes less likely that agents will have matching traits on a given feature,
diminishing the probability they will interact and thus increasing the prob-
ability of isolated groups. It turns out that achieving at least two stable groups
at equilibrium is reliable only when the number of traits is greater than the
number of features (Axelrod 1997).
Axelrod also demonstrates that the results are sensitive to the size of the
array. For an N N lattice and q > F, the maximal number of stable cultural
regions is reached when N 5 15, falling monotonically with greater N. At
N 5 50, the number of stable regions is on average five, for example; at
N5 100, the number falls to roughly two. Cultural diversity is increasingly
difficult to achieve in larger populations, where total convergence is the typ-
ical result (Axelrod 1997).
In addition to the number of culturally distinct groups, the size of those
groups can be taken as a mark of polarization. In a series of extensions of
the Axelrod model, Klemm et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2005) devise a
measure for representing the degree to which a population is dominated
by one homogeneous culture: the ratio of the largest stable region to the
whole. If we let P 5 N  N be the size of the total population and P1,
P2, . . . be the sizes of the subpopulations ranked by size, then their measure
is P1/P. When this “giant size ratio” equals 1 (i.e., when P1 5 P), there is
just a single monoculture. As P1/P moves toward 1/P, either the nondom-
inant groups are getting larger or more groups are forming. One can inter-
pret this measure as a rough alternative to the size parity measures presented
in section 2.9.
Klemm et al. find that there is a specific value of the number of traits q*
at which the giant size ratio changes from values near 1 to values near 0. For
example, a 100 100 lattice with 10 features has a giant size ratio of nearly
1 as long as there are fewer than 55 traits. With more than 55 traits, the giantThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 137size ratio rapidly decreases: it only achieves values less than 0.1 when there
are 60 traits, whereas below 54 traits the result is usually a single uniform
group. For a given N and F, it is only within a very narrow band around q*
that the giant size ratio takes on intermediate values.
Centola et al. (2007) offer a further extension with a variation on Axel-
rod’s static array. In the Axelrod model, it is possible for two neighboring
agents to become incapable of interaction, because their traits differ on all
features, but later to regain that possibility through indirect alignment of
features. As Axelrod notes, borders need not be permanent because contact
with others may give an agent new traits that then allow interaction with a
site it previously had nothing in common with. In the Centola model, in
contrast, agents lose their common edge forever—like a broken link in a
network—whenever they cease to share features in common. In this varia-
tion Centola et al. show that the specific point for the Klemm threshold q*
increases by an order of magnitude, but the rapid transition from a single
large group to many small ones remains.
Although the original model produces polarization in multiple senses
(assuming analogous categorical measures), Axelrod uses only the sense
we call community fracturing to define polarization, measured by the num-
ber of isolated culture groups. In the Klemm and Centola extensions, the
authors focus on another of our senses of polarization: size parity. As out-
lined in section 2.9, polarization in the sense of size parity is maximized
when all the groups have equal sizes and is minimized when there is one
dominant group and the others are significantly smaller. Given the particu-
lars of Axelrod’s base model, minimal size parity aligns exactly with a value
of 1 for Klemm’s ‘giant size ratio’. For other values of Klemm’s measure,
the fit is underdetermined. Klemm’s is a measure merely of the ratio of
the largest group over the whole population. A Klemm measure of 0.5 will
therefore occur in both of these cases: (1) two groups each with 50% of the
territory and (2) one group at 50% and 100 others at 0.5%. Case 1 would be
highly polarized by our measure of size parity, but case 2 would not register
as polarized in this sense.
Although the ‘giant size ratio’measure is easy to calculate and track, and
although it does capture something important about the dynamics of this
particular class of models, it fails to distinguish between these two very dif-
ferent cases. What is of more interest for us here is the shift in focus of what
counts as polarization as one moves from Axelrod to later extensions. Al-
though everybody involved is interested in exploring ‘polarization’, they
are not analyzing the same social patterns. Klemm’s measure cannot distin-
guish between cases 1 and 2 above, Axelrod’s community fracturing sense
would report case 2 as being much more polarized, and size parity would
report case 1 as being more polarized. Because different senses can move
independently and sometimes in opposite directions, this is a clear caseThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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specifying the sense or senses of ‘polarization’ at issue.
Models in the Axelrod family continue to be studied because they are
elegant and noteworthy for both their emphasis on multiple dimensions
and the general result that endogenous rules favoring convergence can nev-
ertheless drive a population to polarization (in certain senses). It turns out
that a variety of senses of polarization, or their analogues, that are evident
in the Axelrod family—dispersion, coverage, community fracturing, opin-
ion cohesion, group divergence, group consensus, and size disparity—are
typically not captured by other traditions. For each of these measures, how-
ever, an appropriate categorical measure must be used instead of the more
familiar cardinal-valued representations in terms of belief or opinion. One
may naturally wonder whether this style of model continues to produce such
a variety of senses of polarization when the traits are considered to be values
on a spectrum.
3.1.2. Cardinal-Valued Traits. As indicated by our use of histograms in
explicating the senses of polarization above, much of the literature on belief
polarization uses ordinal or cardinal-valued belief spectra, such as those de-
rived from Likert scale surveys and discretized population data. Although
still discrete, variables of this type come with a lesser-to-greater order and
usually an implicit/assumed scale such that a value of 1 is closer to 2 than
it is to a value of 5. This creates a metric space that allows the use of distance
measurements between values. Making this move for the Axelrod model,
the similarity of two agents can be calculated as how far apart their trait val-
ues are rather than just how many features have strictly identical traits.
Flache and Macy (2006a) explore this cardinal-valued variation with a
model that allows some features to be categorical (nominal) and others to
be ordered (metric). Categorical features are given distance 0 if identical
and 1 otherwise. For the ordered features, the distance is simply the normal-
ized absolute value of the difference in the trait values. Summing and normal-
izing by the number of features produces a pair-wise similarity score between
zero and one. The probability of an interaction increases with the pair-wise
similarity scores—as long as the similarity is above a threshold—in such
a way that it is equivalent to Axelrod’s interaction rule with certain parame-
ters. This model re-creates the cultural diversity results of Axelrod with sim-
ilar parameters and also replicates a result of Klemm in which diversity dis-
appears with even tiny levels of mutation.
Flache and Macy’s model produces less polarization when metric states
are used instead of categorical ones, with the obvious explanation that there
are more opportunities for being similar (even if just partially) to neighbors.
Despite the change in mechanism and results, however, the basic model in-
vokes the same meanings and measures of polarization as Axelrod’s original.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 139Flache and May further expand the model by adding a “bounded confi-
dence” aspect to the basic mechanism. As we will see in section 3.2, Def-
fuant et al. (2002) and Hegselmann and Krause (2002) propose a mechanism
that has proven seminal in polarization modeling research. In a similar spirit,
Flache and Macy restrict the ‘vision’ of their agents such that they are
only influenced by agents within their sights. Combined with the Axelrod
mechanism, effects turn out to depend strongly on the value of that vision
parameter. If the range of vision is too low, then everybody ends up in his or
her own personal culture; if the range of vision is too high, then the result is
again a monoculture. For intermediate values of the vision parameter there
is a smooth transition from one extreme to the other. The more variables that
are cardinal valued rather than categorical, the greater the threshold must be
in order to transition from maximal to minimal diversity equilibria. For each
cardinal-valued feature, the added mechanism of vision generates groups
of clustered trait values along that dimension; combined with the Axelrod
mechanism this translates to less similarity of neighbors and hence more
isolation—‘polarization’ in the sense of the number of culturally isolated
groups at equilibrium. We could expect the specific values for other mea-
sures, such as group divergence and distinctness, to be effected by this added
mechanism. A study along these lines would benefit from including these
additional measures and comparing the levels of polarization across multi-
ple senses.
3.1.3. Evaluating the Axelrod Tradition. The Axelrod family of models
succeeds in producing a variety of senses of polarization, or their analogues,
from a simple mechanism of similarity-based imitation across local interac-
tion. It has a deep appeal because of this variety and the intuitive represen-
tation of cultures and interaction. But it should be noted that the Axelrod
tradition also faces major limitations even within some of the areas to which
it most clearly applies. In reality, social polarization of all sorts seems easy
to produce, is robust across a wide range of characteristics, and often pro-
liferates despite efforts to generate consensus. It is therefore natural to com-
pare how changes in polarization in the model align with the social polar-
ization we would expect.
In the Axelrod models, polarization only occurs strongly when the num-
ber of traits is greater than the number of features: the characteristics in
which cultures can vary are few relative to the number of ways each char-
acteristic can be expressed. It is not clear how we could systematically or
objectively enumerate the number of either features or traits for real socie-
ties in order to check the plausibility of this claim. As a formal requirement
for at least some cases, however, it may not be implausible. For example,
one interpretation is that there must be more potential positions to take on
each political issue than there are distinct issues on the table.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uOne of the results of Axelrod’s model is that polarization in the sense of
culturally isolated groups is increasingly difficult to produce with larger
populations, such that it is rare with grids larger than 50  50. This has
the unintuitive interpretation that if you increase initial cultural trait cover-
age then you decrease the eventual trait coverage: starting off less polarized
by that measure paradoxically eventually makes society more polarized by
that and other measures. The same is true for spread, dispersion, and other
senses of polarization. Although counterintuitive because more people seems
to imply more space for isolated niches to form, the result is not inexplica-
ble considering the mechanism at work. Greater initial diversity often reg-
isters as greater polarization in the nongroup senses, but it also means a re-
duced chance of agents being culturally isolated from their immediate
neighbors or neighbors two, three, or four steps away. With enough people,
everyone has some common ground with somebody else nearby, and that
common ground facilitates imitation, and that imitation leads eventually to
monoculture.
We have noted the methodological criticism that very different cases are
assigned the same Klemmmeasure. In practice the common model outcome
that results in a lower Klemm ratio is one in which there are more small
groups each of which is only slightly larger. Instead of thinking of Klemm’s
‘giant size ratio’ as a measure of polarization, it might be better to think of it
as a measure of cultural domination in which domination is decreased with
either more groups or larger satellite groups.
The common reality of familiar forms of social polarization is that of
roughly balanced oppositional groups. Polarization of the type that appears
in the Axelrod models at equilibrium, in contrast, almost always either a is
radically one-sided or b appears as a myriad of tiny groups. There is only a
small window around the threshold q* in which a moderate number of mod-
erately sized groups can be achieved as a final outcome, and even that is not
robust to noise or the use of cardinal-valued features. Thus, the familiar so-
cial reality of group size parity polarization—a small number of equally bal-
anced groups—is not something produced by either Axelrod’s mechanism
or its extensions. We also note that the social world, along with almost all of
its socially polarized subsystems, is not in equilibrium. The end-state polar-
ized equilibrium of these models therefore cannot be expected to resemble
the time series of opinions captured in sociological or political surveys.
A major appeal of the Axelrod model remains, despite the limitations
noted. That such a mechanism alone can produce divergence does accord
with some recent empirical research that indicates that in-group members
can be drawn together without any demonstrable psychological out-group
repulsion (Bicchieri 2006; Dreu et al. 2010, 2011). There are other classic
results, however, that show that even neutral evidence on an issue can have
a distancing effect on groups that are already separated (Lord et al. 1979).This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 141The basic mechanism of the Axelrod model, then, may be an important, al-
beit incomplete, piece of the polarization puzzle.
The point of a simple formal model is not to match the empirical dynam-
ics precisely, of course, but to provide general insights into plausible mech-
anisms underlying the observed data. By seeing polarization broken down
into its many senses it becomes possible to evaluate which of the many
senses of polarization a model generates, and to what degree, as the model
dynamics unfold. As noted earlier, Axelrod himself put forward several al-
ternative mechanisms and formulations for social polarization. His aim is
merely to show that a simple mechanism is sufficient to generate some of
the stylized facts of polarization. It is meant to be insightful for one process,
fully acknowledging the simultaneous operation of other mechanisms that
can push and pull in different ways in different contexts. One such mech-
anism, already mentioned in passing, forms the core of the ‘bounded con-
fidence’ family of models.
3.2. Bounded Confidence Family Models. In an influential series of ar-
ticles, Hegselmann and Krause develop a ‘bounded confidence’ model of
opinion polarization that functions in terms of mutual influence among
those within a specific threshold of similarity (Hegselmann and Krause
2002, 2005, 2006). The primary results of the model are the formation of
consensus given certain thresholds for who counts as ‘close enough’ and
the formation of polarized groups with narrower thresholds. Furthermore,
the number and location of the formation of polarized groups occurs at dif-
ferent points for different thresholds. Stated simply, this is another case of
seeming incongruity between a plausible mechanism that can only increase
the similarity of agents yet results in social fragmentation into separate ‘po-
larized’ attitude groups.
Opinions in the Hegselmann-Krause model are mapped onto the [0, 1]
interval, with initial opinions spread uniformly at random. Belief updating
is done by taking a weighted average of the opinions that are ‘close enough’
to an agent’s own. As agents’ beliefs change, a different set of agents or a
different set of values can be expected to influence further updating. One
way to think about the Hegselmann-Krause model is that all agents are ef-
fectively linked in a complete network, since it is possible for any agent to
be influenced by any other. The primary mechanism of the model is then the
threshold for what counts as ‘close enough’ for actual influence. Alterna-
tively, one can think of the model as representing a dynamic network in
which only those with opinions ‘close enough’ to an agent’s are linked in
ways effective for belief updating.
Figure 15 shows the changes in agent opinions over time in single runs
with thresholds ε set at 0.01, 0.15, and 0.25 respectively. With a threshold of
0.01, individuals remain isolated in a large number of small local groups.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uWith a threshold of 0.15, the agents form two permanent groups. With a
threshold of 0.25, the groups fuse into a single consensus opinion. These
are typical representative cases, and runs vary slightly. As might be expected,
all results depend on both (a) the number of individual agents and (b) their
initial random locations across the opinion space. Given any threshold and
sufficient individuals distributed evenly enough, the result of averaging will
be inevitable consensus.
An illustration of average outcomes for different threshold values ap-
pears as figure 16. What is represented here is not change over time but rather
the final opinion positions given different threshold values. As the threshold
value climbs from 0 to roughly 0.20, there is an increasing number of results
with concentrations of agents at the outer edges of the distribution, which
themselves are moving inward. Between 0.22 and 0.26 there is a quick tran-
sition from results with two final groups to results with a single final group.
For values still higher, the two sides are sufficiently within reach that they
coalesce on a central consensus, although the exact location of that final mono-
lithic group changes from run to run creating the fat central spike shown.
Hegselmann and Krause describe the progression of outcomes with an
increasing threshold as going through three phases: “As the homogeneousFigure 15. Example changes in opinion across time from single runs with different
threshold values ε ∈ {0.01, 0.15, 0.25} in the Hegselmann andKrause (2002) model.
Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 143and symmetric confidence interval increases we transit from phase to phase.
More exactly, we step from fragmentation (plurality) over polarisation (po-
larity) to consensus (conformity)” (2012, 11). Here the term ‘polarization’ is
being used to mean bimodality, already mentioned as a common and prob-
lematic identification in the literature. There are (at least) two ways to an-
alyze the dynamics of the Hegselmann-Krause mechanism through our var-
ious senses of polarization: (1) how a population’s opinions shift as a run
progresses (fig. 15) and (2) how the average distribution changes as the
threshold increases (fig. 16).
The dynamics of an individual run make a few features immediately
clear. First, in this model the groups are defined endogenously in exactly
the way described in section 2.4. As a run progresses, the number of groups,
and hence polarization in the sense of community fragmentation, decreases.
Second, the averaging mechanism forces all the opinions within a group to
be eventually identical. Polarization as group consensus therefore neces-
sarily increases through the process. Third, because the opinion-averaging
mechanism fuses any groups that are within the threshold of each other, the
resulting groups are always completely distinct at equilibrium, another sense
in which the mechanism necessarily increases polarization. In addition toFigure 16. Frequency of equilibrium opinion positions for different threshold val-
ues in the Hegselmann and Krause model scaled to [0, 100] (as original with axes
relabeled; Hegselmann and Krause 2002). Slicing along each threshold value pro-
duces a histogram from average outcomes of the type used in defining the measures
in section 2. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uthese, it is clear from the second two frames of figure 15 that spread decreases
as agents at extreme positions are pulled toward the population center, cov-
erage decreases as agents coalesce into single-opinion groups, and the num-
ber of empty regions (regionalization) decreases along with the number of
groups.
In Hegselmann and Krause’s own description of the results of increasing
the threshold, it is clear that the dominant focus is on the number of groups,
going from many to two and then to just one as the threshold increases. Al-
though they emphasize the fact that at medium threshold values the popu-
lation becomes bimodal, we take it that in the sense of community fractur-
ing the polarization steadily decreases with increasing threshold values. The
senses that change with increasing thresholds exactly mirror those that the
mechanism generates in a single run—increasing the threshold serves to am-
plify the effects of that mechanism.
The Hegselmann-Krause model gives us the curious result that it is only
in the senses of group distinctness and group consensus that polarization in-
creases through model runs. In the population-based measures as well as
community fracturing and group divergence polarization decreases. This
is a very different polarization profile than the Axelrod family of models, in
which most of the senses were shown to increase together. Even though
the Hegselmann-Krause model produces distributions that many intuitively
recognize as being highly polarized, they are polarized in only a couple of
our senses. The opposite is true in many more. We are not proposing that
these senses can be directly aggregated into some single measure. The full
profile of all the senses is necessary to understand model dynamics both
here and elsewhere.
The basic Hegselmann-Krause model, as outlined above, involves thresh-
olds applied symmetrically; agents with opinions either to the left or right
within a certain threshold are included in updating an agent’s opinion. Heg-
selmann and Krause also consider variations in which thresholds are ap-
plied asymmetrically, that is, with a different ‘inclusion’ to the left or the
right, either (a) with the same bias for all agents or (b) with a bias keyed to
the current opinion. The idea in the latter case is that those to the right pay
more attention to those to their right; those to the left, more attention to their
left. The former, not surprisingly, pushes the distribution patterns to one side,
while the latter accentuates bimodality.
Because of boundary effects, applying the same bias to everybody brings
size parity back into the picture: it is not just the locations of final groups
that change but the sizes of those groups. Although this is still not a sense
of polarization that Hegselmann and Krause invoke in describing the model,
such an effect could be important in analyzing the application of these mech-
anistic variations to real social phenomena. Just as the first variant a above
increases size parity, the second variant b increases the spread, dispersion,This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 145and divergence senses of polarization. All still decrease as the model runs
over time, but they decrease less than in the base model. Hegselmann and
Krause do provide intuitive explanations of the central mechanism and its
effects, but incorporating specific measures of polarization for each sense
would offer a precise mathematical and conceptual description of how the
distribution of opinions changes.
Deffuant’s Relative Agreement Model.—Deffuant and his collaborators
introduce a number of additional mechanisms in what they term a ‘relative
agreement’ model. Whereas the bounded confidence mechanism updates
agents’ opinions in terms of the average opinion of those within a certain
threshold range of current opinion, Deffuant et al. update agents in random-
ized pair-wise interactions. Any agent may be paired with any other agent to
determine influence, reflecting something like a completely connected un-
derlying interaction network (Deffuant et al. 2002; Deffuant 2006; Meadows
and Cliff 2012).
More significantly, perhaps, the Deffuant model also replaces the sharp
cutoff of influence in Hegselmann-Krause with continuous influence val-
ues. Agents are again assigned both opinion values and threshold (“uncer-
tainty”) ranges, but the extent to which the opinion of agent i is influential
on agent j is proportional to the ratio of the overlap of their ranges (opinion
plus or minus threshold) over i’s range. The closer i and j’s opinions, the
greater the overlap of their threshold ranges and the greater their influence
on each other. The farther apart their opinions, as long as there is any over-
lap at all, the smaller the overlap and the smaller their influence. Deffuant
et al. update both opinion centers and threshold ranges accordingly, result-
ing in the possibility of individuals with narrower and wider ranges. Given
the updating algorithm, influence may be asymmetric: individuals with a
narrower range of tolerance, which Deffuant et al. interpret as higher con-
fidence or lower uncertainty, will be more influential on individuals with a
wider range than vice versa.
For initial opinion values that are uniformly random on the [21, 1] opin-
ion space and initially identical threshold ranges, the results are very much
the same as those of Hegselmann and Krause. Figure 17 shows a typical time
progression of agents’ opinion dynamics, very similar in outcome despite
the important differences in the treatment of thresholds.
One of the major goals of the Deffuant model is the attempt to produce
extremism: convergence of opinion at an extreme end of the opinion range.
Deffuant et al. note that this is possible in the Hegselmann-Krause model
with asymmetric tolerance ranges but that it requires extreme parameters
to produce. Related to this, the model is intended to demonstrate that a posi-
tion that is initially extreme and held by only a few individuals can persuade
the whole population to accept concordant extreme opinions. Deffuant et al.
are able to produce the effect using ‘stubborn’ or ‘high-confidence’ individ-This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
146 AARON BRAMSON ET AL.
All uuals with narrow uncertainty thresholds placed at both ends of the opinion
spectrum.
Although Deffuant et al. thoroughly explore the parameter space and re-
veal a variety of opinion dynamics in different value ranges, the result in
figure 18 is the one most closely associated with ‘polarization’ phenomenaFigure 17. Opinion dynamics in a population of 200 agents for an initial uniform
threshold of 0.4, with the x-axis indicating the average number of iterations per agent
(a proxy for time). Although the relative agreementmechanismdiffers from the bounded
confidence mechanism, with the base parameters the opinion dynamics are very sim-
ilar. From Deffuant et al. (2002). Color version available as an online enhancement.Figure 18. When high-confidence (low-uncertainty, narrow threshold) agents are
used at the ends of the spectrum, more than 98% of the initially moderate (light
gray) agents are pulled to one side (in this case toward 1). Shading indicates increas-
ing confidence (lower ability to influence) as the population becomes more extreme
and more homogeneous. From Deffuant et al. (2002). Color version available as an
online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 147and marks the primary departure from the Hegselmann-Krause model.
Within this parameter zone the result is always two groups, one at each ex-
treme, because the initially extreme agents at one end will never move to the
other end. It is common for one-sided extremism to result even when there
are the same number of initial extremists at both ends as in figure 18. Whether
the result is most of the agents at one end or a split to both sides depends
mainly on the random order of the pair-wise comparison updating.
Although the mechanism does not strictly force a large disparity in sizes,
and in some runs the population is split nearly in the center, the typical re-
sult is a stochastic symmetry breaking such that most of the moderate cen-
tral population snowballs to one side. Size parity is therefore a sense of po-
larization captured by the Deffuant et al. mechanism, more interesting
precisely because it usually happens but is not obvious from the description
of the agent update rules. The authors themselves admit that they did not
foresee such a result.
Like the Hegselmann-Krause model, groups here must be defined endog-
enously by the opinion space. The number of groups, and hence polariza-
tion in the sense of community fracturing, decreases through time. Because
of the stubbornness of the extreme agents, spread decreases only slightly
because of a centrist pull. Coverage, regionalization, group distinctness,
and group consensus change similarly as in the Hegselmann-Krause model,
with some increasing and some decreasing.
Population dispersion decreases noticeably here as a by-product of the
group size disparity. These two are the only senses of polarization that dif-
fer between the bounded confidence mechanism and the relative agreement
mechanism. Polarization decreases in the sense of population dispersion, but
the literature is rather quiet on that point. The most often-cited result is that
polarization increases in the sense of size parity, together with group consen-
sus and distinctness. There is something intuitive about bimodal movement
of opinions away from each other on a spectrum. Here however the result is
one of near uniformity at biased extremes. Deffuant’s intuitions regarding
the influence of strongly held minority opinions shaping the population’s
ideology are plausible ones but may not be the same phenomenon at issue
in opinion polarization on abortion or gun rights, for example. Although the
influence mechanism and the resulting opinion dynamics do seem to capture
an important social force, it is not clear that ‘polarization’ is the most appro-
priate way to understand it.
3.3. Evaluating the Bounded Confidence Family of Models. Perhaps the
greatest strike against this second family of models is that the central mech-
anism itself seems distinctly unreal. The main driver of the Hegselmann and
Krause results is a mechanism of ‘peeling back from the edges’. The opin-
ion distribution exhibited occurs for the very specific reason that agents atThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uthe left and right edges of the opinion space have no one to pull them left or
right. They therefore drift toward the center, with either central or separated
points of convergence dictated by the ε threshold. Despite the change in
treatment of thresholds, the Deffuant et al. models inherit that central mech-
anism.
All models in this family cite and draw on a long tradition of belief av-
eraging as a simple representation of the important psychological phenom-
enon of peer influence (French 1956; DeGroot 1974). But we are aware of
virtually no evidence that real polarization occurs ‘from the edges’ as it
does in these models or that it crystallizes in virtue of a specific distance
from the edges as it does here. Indeed, there is a great body of evidence that
the dynamics of developing polarization are quite different. The classic
study by Lord et al. (1979) shows groups in laboratory conditions that pro-
gressively polarize, increasing the distance between them over time despite
balanced bodies of evidence (see also Miller et al. 1993; Kuhn and Lao
1996). Cooper, Kelly, and Weaver claim that “one of the most robust find-
ings in social psychology is that of attitude polarization following discus-
sion with like-minded others” (2001, 267).
Recall figure 9, showing American attitudes toward abortion between
1977 and 1993. That same figure serves to indicate the real limitations of
the family of models considered. The models at issue can neither produce
nor preserve the pattern of polarization evident there, that with a smaller
central consensus with a heavy and consistent large group at the liberal end.
Most noticeably, and in contrast to the reality of polarization, that liberal
consensus would inevitably move right in models with a Hegselmann-
Krause mechanism, and the large group of moderates would inevitable
move to one side or the other using the Deffuant mechanism. Furthermore,
such a phenomenon in the Deffuant models requires a careful planting of
extremists with manually altered uncertainty thresholds to counteract the
Hegselmann-Krause effect. Repeated studies show average attitudes among
groups shifting toward extremes in terms of some mechanism not captured
in the family of attraction-driven models considered here. The reality of in-
creasing polarization of these familiar types, wherever it occurs, is a dynamic
that this family of models is incapable of producing. Thesemodels also seem
to capture an important and intuitive piece of the story of social opinion dy-
namics; however, it is not the whole story, and in many particulars it may not
be most profitably read as a story of ‘polarization’ at all.
3.4. Structural Balance. Although less heralded in the computational
literature, a third family of models for polarization has equal claim to con-
sideration. Structural balance theory, also known as social balance theory,
originated in the mid-1940s through the work of Fritz Heider, who studied
patterns of belief coherence in individual psychology (Heider 1946). In theThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 149mid-1950s, Cartwright and Harary generalized and formalized Heider’s the-
ory using basic graph theory (Cartwright and Harary 1956; Harary 1959).
Consider a set of nodes (e.g., people or countries) joined into a network cap-
turing not just whether they have a relationship but also the valence of that
relationship. In the base version, if two nodes are joined then they are either
friends or enemies; later versions allow valence weights between 21 and 1
(Kulakowski, Gawronski, and Gronek 2005). In the original analyses, a
structure was considered ‘balanced’ whenever all paths—all unique se-
quences of links connecting each pair of nodes—had an odd number of neg-
ative links. Although there is some recent work that returns to the original
‘all paths’ version of balance calculations (Facchetti, Iacono, and Altafini
2011), Abell (1968) made the case against longer paths being meaningful
for social relationships, and in most structural balance research the funda-
mental unit of analysis has been a triad of three mutually linked nodes.
A triad is considered unstable if there is social pressure to change one of
the relationship links; it is considered stable if there is no social pressure to
change. The case of zero enmity is considered a stable triangle of friend-
ship. A stable triad with two enmity links simultaneously captures the slo-
gans ‘the enemy of my friend is my enemy’ and ‘the enemy of my enemy is
my friend’. Those slogans also highlight the source of instability in the other
possible patterns. If some agent A is friends with both B and C, but B and C
are enemies, then A will be under pressure by both friends to choose sides,
and B and C will be under pressure to make amends. In a triad with three
mutual enemy relationships, there is pressure for two of them to ally against
the third. Graphical relationships of these stable and unstable configurations
are presented in the left portion of figure 19. Note that changing the valence
of any single link in a stable triad will make it unstable, while changing the
valence of any single link in an unstable triad will make it stable.
Larger social systems are classified as ‘balanced’ if all triads are stable,
‘unbalanced’ otherwise, with the level of instability typically calculated as
the proportion of stable triads in the network as a whole. There are three
types of stable configurations in larger networks: universal harmony, fac-
tions, and mixed networks, depicted on the right side of figure 19. In bal-
anced networks with universal harmony, all links are friendship links. In
factions, the network exhibits groups of mutually friendly nodes separated
entirely from each other by enmity links. Mixed networks contain both pos-
itive and negative links in such a way that the network is balanced without
forming factions.
It is easy to envisage a dynamic through which a network with initially
randomly assigned valences can move toward a balanced network step by
step. For example, (1) choose a triad at random; (2) if it is stable, do noth-
ing; (3) if unstable, the valence of a random link in that triad is ‘flipped’
from positive to negative or vice versa. Flipping that valence may well makeThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uneighboring triads that also used that link unstable, of course, but as the
process continues the network can be expected to move toward one of the
balanced network configurations. In fact, given enough time any such ran-
dom walk-like dynamic will eventually reach an equilibrium stable con-
figuration.
A promise for understanding polarization can be seen in that dynamic.
It is easy to prove that, for any complete network, progressively flipping va-
lences within unstable triads will necessarily lead to either universal har-
mony or (with much higher probability) a ‘social mitosis’ resulting in pre-
cisely two groups, linked only by friendship internally and only by links of
enmity between the two groups (Wang and Thorngate 2003; Sack et al.
2014). Social networks that are less than fully connected allow for more
than two factions and the possibility of mixed networks, but the pattern to-
ward social mitosis of the groups is still very much a dominant one (Hum-
mon and Doreian 2003).
In order to use structural balance as a model for opinion polarization, we
must first interpret it in terms of opinions, beliefs, or attitudes rather than
friends and enemies. The most direct way to achieve this is by assuming that
agents hold beliefs on some topic. Agents who agree in their belief have a
positive link, while those who disagree have a negative link. This interpre-
tation makes both the stability and instability of triads as well as factional
splitting natural: a network is balanced whenever all and only people who
hold opposite beliefs disagree. The modeling implication for polarization isFigure 19. Left, four possible configurations of positive and negative links (ignor-
ing rotation) as well as their classification under stable or unstable triads. Right, four
larger structures capturing different types of stable and unstable social networks.
Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 151this: perhaps we see so much polarization because almost all stable opinion
configurations within a population are polarized in this way. There is some
empirical evidence for changes in social and political relations operating in
roughly this way (Hart 1974; Facchetti et al. 2011; Kunegis 2014).
What senses of polarization can a structural balance mechanism pro-
duce? As outlined, the basic dynamics are driven by increasing network
‘balance’, but on an interpretation in terms of agreement and disagreement
there are implicit belief changes as well. We can assign all nodes of a stable
triad with all positive ‘agreement’ links a belief of either p or :p. In a stable
triad with two positive ‘agreement’ links and one negative ‘disagreement’
link, we can assign p to two nodes and :p to one, or :p to two and p to one.
But there is no way to assign p and :p to nodes of unstable triads of agree-
ment and disagreement without some node being assigned both p and :p.
The basic mechanism of structural balance proceeds by changing link va-
lences, and this is equivalent to changing beliefs so that the relationships
of agreement and disagreement change appropriately.
Here we might suggest a model in which agents may have beliefs 1 or21
but in which agents in ‘frustrated’ positions (i.e., nodes in unstable tri-
angles) are assigned intermediate belief values that are the average across
all neighbors of link valence belief. If an agent’s only connection is a neg-
ative ‘disagreement’ link to a neighbor with belief 51, that agent will have
a belief 5 21, for example. If an agent has disagreement links to both a
neighbor with belief 5 1 and a neighbor with belief 5 21, his belief will
be 0 as the average. If a node has agreement links to two neighborswith beliefs
5 1 and an agreement link to a neighbor with belief 521, his intermediate
belief value will be the link valence-weighted average of 1/3. As a final ex-
ample, a node with an agreement link to a neighbor with belief5 1/3 and a
disagreement link to a neighbor with belief 5 2/3 will have an intermediate
belief 5 21/9.
Given this assignment of intermediate beliefs, we can suggest a dynam-
ics for belief revision that uses the basic mechanisms of structural balance
theory, although within a model of opinion change. Consider a randomly
chosen node, and suppose that the product of link valence  neighbor val-
ues used to calculate the current belief of that node is positive—equivalently,
whether its current value is positive. We then change the valence of random
link, if any, that will result in a recalculation of belief value that moves that
value further in the positive direction. If we randomly choose a node for
which that product is negative—such that its current value is negative—
we change the valence of a random link, if any, that will take its value further
in the negative direction. Our conjecture is that a belief dynamics of this sort,
appropriate to interpretation in terms of opinion polarization, will characteris-
tically show a pattern of opinion mitosis toward belief extremes of 1 and21
that parallels social mitosis in the original structural balance model.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uWhat senses of polarization could such a model capture? What counts as
‘polarization’ under structural balance theory is clearly community fractur-
ing, a move from something like the unstable mixed diagram to the stable
factions diagram in figure 19. A network that is polarized in opinion through
analogous mechanisms will also have factions in which all agents within
each faction hold the same belief of either 1 or21. Multiple groups of nodes
holding the same belief can exist as long as there are no direct links between
those same-belief factions. The degree of polarization in the sense of com-
munity fracturing can then be measured as the number of such groups.
Our conjecture is that final histograms of community-fractured (or fac-
tionalized) belief configurations will show beliefs close to 1 and 21; fully
balanced systems will converge to the extremes, and only stable mixed con-
figurations would show intermediate values in the final histograms. For
these outcomes, the population-based senses of polarization—spread, dis-
persion, coverage, and regionalization—could not be usefully applied to
compare final outcomes. Dispersion and coverage could be used, however,
to track movements in population beliefs as the network stabilizes. Cover-
age would decrease as nodes with intermediate values push to extremes by
mechanisms of triad balancing, with an increase in polarization in the sense
of section 2.3. Polarization in the sense of the dispersion of beliefs increases
as agents move to any stable configuration. Polarization as distinctness will
increase along with coverage and dispersion as a population factionalizes,
but it should be noted that none of these will necessarily progress monoton-
ically; as in the original structural balance model, a change that increases
the balance of a local triad may cause imbalance in other triads sharing one
of its links. Size parity can also be measured as an opinion network evolves,
but it is neither explicitly nor implicitly part of structural balance.
A fairly glaring limitation of models in the structural balance tradition
should also be mentioned. As early as 1964, Abelson notes that computa-
tional models of opinion dynamics can easily fail by inevitably producing
a radically unrealistic convergence of opinion to the center (Abelson 1964).
Computational models that produce ‘polarization’ as inexorable drives to
exclusive polar extremes of21 and 1 will be radically unrealistic in the op-
posite direction. Structural balance models, whatever their other virtues, are
clearly in this category.
3.5. Other Signed Networks. A number of other models produce results
closely related to structural balance, using aHopfieldmechanism of dynamic
attraction that also echoes aspects of similarity interaction in Axelrod
(Macy et al. 2003; Flache and Macy 2006b; Kitts 2006). In a Hopfield net-
work, edge weights are determined through local calculations similar
to those proposed in the section above but in which each node’s attribute
is set to 1 or 21 depending on whether it is above or below 0 (HopfieldThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 1531982). In Macy et al. (2003), nodes are characterized with either one or
more binary states or one or more continuous states between 1 and 0. Link
weights, or influence levels, are updated in Axelrod fashion as a function of
the similarity between two linked nodes. If they occupy the same spot in the
state space, the link between them becomes increasingly positive; if not, in-
creasingly negative. Node characteristics are asynchronously updated by
taking the link-weighted average node characteristics across one’s local
neighbors and checking it against a threshold, then moving up to 1 or down
to 0 accordingly. Where multiple characteristics are used, the process is re-
peated for each one independently.
The Macy model is not conceived in terms of structural balance among
triads but rather in terms of the accord between a node’s values and those
of its neighbors. Feature values for each node get pushed and pulled until
every node’s features are minimally different from its network neighbors’
nodes. Just as in Axelrod, similarity-based influence is crucial, although
similarity here is to all neighbors rather than pair-wise. Here, neighbors
who are more different than average are pushed away to reinforce the dif-
ference. Despite these differences in conception, with binary agents the dy-
namics of the Macy model produce configurations precisely like those of
structural balance. Here again the result is a ‘polarization’ in which factions
of agents with similar characteristics are separated from those with other
characteristics. If more features are used to characterize agents, it is possible
for many more than two unique factions to persist at equilibrium. For each
group, however, there must be some similarity with all other groups except
one. For example, there could be stable groups of {0, 0}, {0, 1}, and {1, 1},
a multidimensional scenario invoking polarization as ‘belief convergence’
as outlined in section 2.10.3. Here, as in its structural balance predecessor, a
homogeneous distribution is stable, but starting from a random assignment
of characteristic values there is a vanishingly small probability of such a re-
sult. A sufficient exogenous shock, moreover, will knock the system out of
a homogeneous situation and will usually lead again to a ‘polarized’ out-
come. All of these are aspects of interest in the model. But because the re-
sults echo those of structural balance, the same senses of ‘polarization’, with
the same limitations, will apply.
With a goal of generating dynamics indicative of social norms, Kitts
(2006) offers a further variation that incorporates intentional sanctioning
behavior. Contagion-based influence is enhanced with frameworks for pun-
ishment and reward in terms of utility functions. Edge weights and therefore
influence levels are updated using a Hebbian reinforcement learning algo-
rithm. Here again, although not explicitly built into the model, the updating
rule combined with the use of utility functions produces a result closely re-
lated to structural balance theory. Here and in other models (Flache and
Macy 2006b) results are again similar across a variety of parameter varia-This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All utions, with senses of polarization that are again those of the base structural
balance model.
3.6. Group Polarization in Social Psychology. Up to now our focus
has been on the three major families of computational models applied to
phenomena of polarization. The term ‘polarization’ has also appeared in
other literature without being operationalized into a formal model. Here
we discuss one such case for which something approaching a model can
be abstracted from the literature, at least close enough to be worthy of in-
clusion.
The experimental findings of Lord et al. (1979) on belief polarization
show that individuals tend to reinforce and move their beliefs in a more ex-
treme direction when exposed to mixed evidence that, prima facie, would
seem to lead to a more centrist position. Extending this finding further,
self-categorization theory within social psychology defines ‘group polariza-
tion’ as the “conformity to a polarized norm which defines one’s own group
in contrast to other groups within a specific social context” (Hogg et al.
1990, 77). The theory predicts that in the context of confrontation with an-
other group or other groups, in-group discussion will yield a “consensual
group position that is more extreme than the mean of the individual group
members’ prediscussion attitudes in the direction already favored by the
group” (78). In the case of a centrist group confronted with groups on both
sides, the prediction is a tighter focus on the mean. Although psychological
explanations are provided for these attitude movements, they have not been
operationalized as formal mechanisms.
Self-categorization theory posits that a group’s norm is actually further
away from the population’s mean attitude than the members’ mean atti-
tudes. When confrontation makes the issue salient, the group members ad-
just their attitudes to the perceived group norm and thus exaggerate their
attitudes. This force bootstraps itself over time to produce increasingly ex-
treme positions for members of the groups on the edges of the population.
But the same mechanism pushes groups toward the population mean when
confronted with groups more extreme than they are. Although the work in
social psychology does not provide us models or opinion data, we can still
refine our understanding of the claims being made by analyzing them in
terms of our senses of polarization.
The theory is already conceived in terms of groups, so the appropriate
senses of polarization will be the group-based ones. We can understand
the claim that confrontation with an external group pushes the group mean
to the perceived group norm as an increase in polarization in the sense of
group consensus (decreased variance of in-group attitudes). The specific
claim regarding the direction and amount of movement is relative to the ex-
ternal group(s) and thus can best be captured as an increase in divergence.This content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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between extreme groups, increasing divergence by narrowing on to the mean
value. There is no mention in the theory of a change in the number of groups,
or of the focal group splitting, so community fracturing is not a sense relevant
to this theory. Although the combined changes in group consensus and di-
vergence are likely to produce an increase in distinctness, spread, dispersion,
and coverage as well, there is nothing explicitly said about the dissimilarity
of the groups beyond the direction andmagnitude of their intragroup and inter-
group differences. The ‘group polarization’ of self-categorization theory thus
can be fully described in terms of consensus and divergence, although the dy-
namics of belief changemay also show spread, dispersion, coverage, and dis-
tinctness.
4. Conclusion. With nine disambiguated senses and measures for ‘polar-
ization’—spread, dispersion, coverage, regionalization, community fractur-
ing, distinctness, divergence, group consensus, and size parity—we have
attempted to evaluate the three major families of computational models that
have been offered in the literature: the Axelrod family of cultural diffusion
models, bounded confidence and relative agreement models, and structural
balance models layered with belief transmission. To those we have added
the prospect of models built with the fundamentals of self-categorization
theory within social psychology.
An overview of results is shown in table 1. In the Axelrod tradition, ‘po-
larization’ in the sense put forward in the original (Axelrod 1997) model
and in the Flache and Macy (2006a) extension to cardinal traits is polariza-
tion in the sense of community fracturing. In the Axelrod-tradition models
of Klemm et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2005) and Centola et al. (2007),
polarization as size parity is emphasized instead, with a similar link to other
senses. We have found other senses of polarization, or plausible analogues,
to be mathematically linked to the central phenomenon of community frac-
turing, increasing as it does. But none of these models is appropriate to po-
larization in the sense of regionalization. Although the senses of polariza-
tion presented here are logically independent and mathematically pair-wise
independent, given the modeling constraints of the Axelrod family they be-
come mathematically linked to each other. One implication is that models of
this first family will prove inappropriate for any empirical case in which po-
larization occurs in some of the senses outlined but not in others.
Community fracturing is the sense of polarization that is the focus of the
Axelrod family of models. But it is a decrease in community fracturing, to-
gether with an increase in group consensus, that is taken as the mark of po-
larization put forward in the bounded confidence model of Hegselmann and
Krause (2002). The same holds for the Deffuant et al. (2002) and Deffuant
(2006) models, although in these models polarization as size parity appearsThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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All uas well. Here again other senses of polarization are mathematically linked,
although often with a different direction than in the Axelrod models: it is
decreases rather than increases in spread, coverage, and distinctness that ac-
company polarization in the sense at issue here. A different clustering of
senses of polarization might well encourage profitable empirical investiga-
tion. The existence of social phenomena that exhibit one cluster of senses of
polarization rather than another might support a hypothesis of one model
mechanism rather than another. Our senses of polarization remain pair-
wise logically independent, however, and here as before we have a family
of models that will apply only to cases in which a particular cluster of senses
inevitably occur together.
Extensions of the structural balance model offer a third family of com-
putational models, in which polarization is put forward as community frac-
turing, divergence, and group consensus (Heider 1946; Cartwright and
Harary 1956; Harary 1959; Macy et al. 2003; Flache andMacy 2006b; Kitts
2006). Mechanisms in some extensions incorporate aspects of the Axelrod
model, and distinct senses of polarization are mathematically linked in
ways similar to the Axelrod family. As noted, the structural balance family
also has the downside of producing polarization only as migration to ab-
solute opinion extremes on a spectrum. We have sketched the possibility
of a more formal model using the mechanisms of group polarization in
self-categorization theory (Lord et al. 1979; Hogg et al. 1990), which exhib-
its divergence and group consensus but does not touch on polarization in
the sense of community fracturing or size parity.
The first conclusion, we suggest, is that there is a need for attention to
different senses of polarization in both the empirical and modeling litera-
ture. Different and apparently rival claims regarding whether America is be-
coming increasingly polarized, for example, may be addressing polarization
in importantly different senses. We have shown that different families of
computational models offered as mechanisms for opinion polarization pro-
duce very different phenomena, with very different connections, under that
ambiguous term.
A second conclusion is that none of the families of available computa-
tional models is adequate to capture all of the senses of polarization de-
scribed, particularly with an eye to producing polarization in those logically
independent senses independently. If there are senses of polarization that do
in fact always appear together, or do so within particular social phenomena,
this potential shortcoming may be a hidden strength: in that case one or an-
other of these model families may offer a plausible single mechanism be-
hind clusters of polarization phenomena. Our suspicion, however, is that real
phenomena of polarization are various enough, and subtle enough, that a
full understanding will require a suite of models capable of something more:
capable of producing polarization in all of its senses and with appropriateThis content downloaded from 129.049.005.035 on October 02, 2017 11:47:23 AM
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UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION 157independence under appropriate circumstances. That is a modeling frame-
work that does not yet exist. The current project highlights both the value
of such a broadly capable framework and some of the specific targets within
the literature of polarization that it would need to include.REFERENCES
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